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A DEFENCE OF HART’S SEMANTICS
AS NONAMBITIOUS CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco∗
School of Law, University of Birmingham
Two methodological claims in Hart’s The Concept of Law have produced perplexity:
that it is a book on “analytic jurisprudence”1 and that it may also be regarded as
an essay in “descriptive sociology.”2 Are these two ideas reconcilable? We know
that mere analysis of our legal concepts cannot tell us much about their properties,
that is, about the empirical aspect of law. We have learned this from philosophical
criticisms of conceptual analysis; yet Hart informs us that analytic jurisprudence can
be reconciled with descriptive sociology. The answer to this puzzle lies in the notion
of nonambitious conceptual analysis. The theorist analyzes concepts but accepts
the limitations of conceptual analysis and therefore uses empirical knowledge and
substantive arguments to explain, refine, or perhaps refute initial insights provided
by intuitions. This is the conclusion that this paper arrives at as an argumentative
strategy to defend Hart’s legal theory from the criticisms of Stavropoulos and Dworkin.
The latter argues that Hart’s legal theory cannot explain theoretical disagreements in
law because he relies on a shared criterial semantics. Stavropoulos aims to show
that Hart’s semantics is committed to ambitious conceptual analysis and relies on
the usage of our words as a standard of correctness. Both attacks aim to show that
the semantic sting stings Hart’s legal theory. This essay refines both challenges and
concludes that not even in the light of the most charitable interpretation of these
criticisms is Hart’s legal theory stung by the semantic sting. This study defends the
view that Hart’s methodological claims were modest and that he was aware of the
limits of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. He was, this study claims,
far ahead of his time.
INTRODUCTION
Dworkin’s semantic sting argument3 is one of the most interesting and con-
troversial topics of contemporary legal philosophy. The argument arises as a
criticism of Hart’s legal theory and states that Hart’s legal positivism cannot
*I am grateful to the anonymous referees for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. H.L.A Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994).
2. Id.
3. Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE 31–46 (1986).
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explain theoretical disagreements because it presupposes that participants
of a linguistic community possess shared criteria for applying a concept.
Therefore if two or more participants, according to this approach, do not
share these criteria, they talk at cross-purposes. Dworkin points out that this
model of legal disagreement is unsatisfactory since it does not explain the
kind of disagreements in which legal participants are commonly engaged.
Legal phenomena, therefore, remain unexplained. In law, Dworkin tells
us, disagreements arise over different conceptions of a concept. Legal phe-
nomena are recalcitrant on this feature: legal participants might not possess
shared criteria. But they do engage in “genuine” legal disagreements. For
example, the concept “fairness” might be the subject of a legal disagreement
in which the participants do not possess shared criteria for its application.
Nevertheless they “genuinely” disagree over whether it is fair to give com-
pensation to a close relative of a victim who suffers psychiatric injury in the
aftermath of an accident. These disagreements are not only common within
the legal domain but are also common in morality and aesthetics. Thus two
art critics might not possess shared criteria for applying the concept “art”
but can still have genuine disagreements about whether photography is art.
Two or more participants in a discussion might not have shared criteria for
applying the concept “good person,” yet they can disagree genuinely on the
different conceptions of the concept “good person.” In answer to the ques-
tion of what kind of disagreements these are, Dworkin replies that they are
theoretical disagreements, which means that they are disagreements about
different conceptions of a concept. Raz’s response,4 by contrast, is that it
is not necessary to think in terms of different conceptions of a concept to
explain the kind of theoretical disagreements that Dworkin has in mind.
He argues that a more sophisticated model of criterial semantic explana-
tions provides a better framework to understand these disagreements. Raz
adumbrates the possibility of a model that satisfies all the requirements of a
criterial model as attributed to Hart and simultaneously gives a satisfactory
explanation of theoretical disagreements.
Coleman has also criticized Dworkin’s view and argues that Dworkin con-
fuses the notion of law in its more general meaning with the notion of the law
of a particular community. Thus, while it is true that on a criterial semantics
argument two individuals who follow different rules for applying the con-
cept “law” might be assigning different meanings to it, it does not follow that
two people who are using two different factual criteria to decide whether a
proposition of law is true or false must be assigning different meaning to
the concept “law” or that they are employing different concepts.5 Defend-
ers of Dworkin such as Stavropoulos6 argue that Hart is led by a semantic
4. Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPTS 1–37 (Jules Coleman, ed., 2001).
5. Jules Coleman, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 181 (2001).
6. Nicos Stavropoulos, Hart’s Semantics, in HART’S POSTSCRIPTS 59–98 ( Jules Coleman, ed.,
2001). (hereinafter “HS ”).
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project and that one of its constitutive elements is “conceptual analysis.”
Stavropoulos thinks that the key of Hart’s conceptual analysis is the notion
of shared criteria that can be identified analyzing the usage of our words.
His target of attack is not Raz’s criterial model or Coleman’s criticism; rather
it is those who think that Hart did not have a semantic theory in mind at
all.7
The debate is rich, complex, and crucial to assessing the success or fail-
ure of Dworkin’s and Hart’s legal theories. Stavropoulos attempts to show
that Hart relied ambitiously on the notion of conceptual analysis and that,
therefore, Dworkin’s semantic sting criticism applies successfully to Hart’s
legal theory.8 This paper argues that Stavropoulos fails in his endeavor;
the discussion will be presented in the following line of argument: the
weaknesses of Stavropoulos’s arguments will be made apparent and then
a revision of the semantic sting argument, called the semantic properties
test argument, will be advanced. The study goes on to show that Hart’s
conceptual analysis eschews successfully both the former and the latter se-
mantic arguments. In other words, even the most powerful interpretation
of Dworkin’s semantic sting argument does not weaken Hart’s semantics
as conceptual analysis. Hart envisaged conceptual analysis as a philosoph-
ical method, yet conceptual analysis relies on semantic elements, and two
different kinds can be distinguished. First, ambitious conceptual analysis
claims that the semantic elements alone are sufficient to understand the
nature of our concepts. Second, nonambitious conceptual analysis denies
this claim. The discussion shows that Hart’s conceptual analysis is nonambi-
tious and therefore that the semantic sting argument cannot sting his legal
theory.
Part I of this article discusses Stavropoulos’s scrutiny of Hart’s semantics
and shows the deficiencies of his approach. Part II explains the semantic
sting argument and the failure of its application to Hart’s semantics as con-
ceptual analysis. It consequently advances the semantic properties test argu-
ment as a more powerful interpretation of the semantic sting argument. It
might be argued that the semantic sting argument does contain a minimum
of truth in claiming that semantics should not be the most important aspect
in determining the properties of concepts. The paper demonstrates that if
Hart’s philosophical method is ambitious conceptual analysis, then his legal
theory does fall prey to a new and more sophisticated semantic sting. But
the premise fails and the study shows that we can take the venom out of the
sting.
7. His target is Timothy Endicott’s essay, Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPTS 39–58 (Jules Coleman, ed., 2001), in which the author argues that Hart did not
advocate either a criterial semantic theory nor any semantic theory at all, if a semantic theory
is a general explanatory account of what makes an application of an expression correct.
8. Stavropoulos, HS at 98.
102 VERONICA RODRIGUEZ-BLANCO
I. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS: A PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK
Stavropoulos attributes to Hart a semantic project. Semantics is widely con-
structed as “theoretical claims regarding the structure and nature of lan-
guage and the character of concepts.”9 It also comprises issues studied under
the rubric of philosophy of mind, such as the individuation of thoughts.10
Stavropoulos argues that Hart relied on semantics in at least two ways; he
says, first, that Hart engages in conceptual analysis; and second, that he
embraces the doctrine of open texture.11
This paper focuses on Stavropoulos’s first claim. The question of what
conceptual analysis is, is already a controversial issue, although there is a
set of common features that satisfactorily characterize the notion as a philo-
sophical method that aims to clarify thoughts, concepts, and propositions.
The goal of conceptual analysis is to describe or define concepts in terms of
other concepts or perhaps to say certain things in one vocabulary in terms
of a more fundamental vocabulary, for example, by using physical vocab-
ulary to describe mental states or nonmoral vocabulary to describe moral
issues. Conceptual analysis retrieves our intuitions, or what is familiar to us,
or the things with which we are acquainted, and organizes them. It uses
verbal expressions, such as sentences and words, because this is the only
way we can gain access to our concepts and propositions, but it should be
noted that the subject of analysis is not the verbal expression itself.12 It is
conceptual and not linguistic analysis. Moreover while conceptual analysis
seeks to access our intuitions and ordinary conceptions, the subject matter
of the analysis is not our intuitions and acquaintances. Further, word usage
can lead to misunderstanding, since the ordinary usage and the technical
one can come into conflict.13 Conceptual analysis sharpens the usage of our
9. Id. at 60.
10. Id. at 60.
11. Id. at 60.
12. G.E. Moore in his reply to Langford clarifies the point that conceptual analysis is not
about verbal expressions. He points out: “Now I think I can say quite definitely that I never in-
tended to use the word in such a way that the analysandum would be a verbal expression. When I
talked about analyzing anything, what I have talked of analyzing has always been an idea or con-
cept or proposition, and not a verbal expression; that is to say, if I talked of analyzing a ‘proposi-
tion’ in such a sense that no verbal expression (no sentence, for instance) can be a proposition,
in that sense.” G.E. Moore, Reply, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF G.E. MOORE 661 (Arthur Schillp, ed.,
1942). Hart also rejects the idea that analysis is only about “words” and quotes J.L. Austin, A Plea
for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, (1956–7) 33–34, in which he says at the end of
the passage: “A definition of this familiar type does two things at once. It simultaneously pro-
vides a code or formula translating the word into other well-understood terms and locates for
us the kind of thing to which the word is used to refer, by indicating the features which it shares
in common with a wider family of things and those which marked it off from others of that same
family. In searching for and finding such definitions we are looking not merely at words . . .
but also at the realities we use words to talk about. We are using a sharpened awareness of words
to sharpen our perception of the phenomena.” On the same topic see J.D. Wisdom, Philosophy,
Metaphysics and Psychoanalysis, in PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 251–252 (1953) who is quoted
by Hart in CONCEPT OF LAW 233 (1994), see notes to p. 4 (hereinafter “CL”).
13. On this matter G.E. Moore argues: “In other words, we may be able to use an expres-
sion perfectly correctly without being able to provide a correct philosophical analysis of the
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words. Another facet of conceptual analysis is that it is “a priori” because it
aims to understand concepts before actual experience. For example, in or-
der to analyze the concept “negligence,” we need to retrieve our intuitions
and the familiar notions that we associate with this concept. We then look
at the usage of the word “negligence,” because this is a way to gain access
to our intuitions about the concept. Thus we might say that “negligence” is
connected to the concepts of “duty,” “reasonableness,” and “intentionality.”
We might consequently refine the use of the concept “reasonableness” and
find it obscure and say that it is better to link the concept “negligence” to
the concept of “objective standard of duty.” If we aim to analyze the concept
“law,” we must first retrieve our knowledge of it. We know that it is connected
to concepts such as “morality,” “rule-governed behavior,” and “obligation”14
and following this connection may analyze its contextual usage in terms such
as “international law” or “primitive law.” The former context is misleading,15
since users of this concept do not consider that international law is “law,”
however, the analysis does reveal that the concept “international law” shares
some basic features with the concept “law.” It is apparent then that the actual
usage is mistaken.
It can be argued that in traditional conceptual analysis, the result of analy-
sis is an analytic truth such as “all bodies are extended.” Kant defined analytic
truths as judgments in which the predicate is part of the subject:
Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection
of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity. If I say, for in-
stance, “All bodies are extended,” this is an analytic judgment. For I do not
require to go beyond the concept which I connect with “body” in order to find
extension as bound up with it. To meet with this predicate, I have merely to
analyse the concept, that is, to become conscious to myself of the manifold
which I always think in that concept.16
However, analytic truths say nothing about the world; they simply describe
the relationship between the terms of a proposition. By contrast, according
to Kant, judgments of experience are all synthetic. Kant tell us that the
proposition that a body is extended is a priori and is not empirical. However,
the judgment “all bodies are heavy” is different from anything that I think in
the mere concept of body in general.17 Critics of conceptual analysis argue
that it relies on the truth of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and object to
such a stark distinction. These objections to conceptual analysis were raised
concept or proposition denoted by the expression.” G. E. Moore, Necessity, in 9 MIND 289–304, at
290.
14. H.L.A Hart’s CL begins by saying that these three concepts are interrelated and that
this relationship causes perplexity. This perplexity justifies the study of the relationship of these
concepts (CL at 6–8).
15. Hart, CL, at 3–4.
16. I. Kant, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON B11, at 48–49 (Norman Kempf Smith, trans., 1992).
17. Id., B11–12, at 48–49.
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mainly by Quine, Kripke, and Hilary Putnam18 in the sixties and seventies.
Some describe a priori truths as conceptual truths on the basis that they
are all true in virtue of the nature of the concepts they contain. Jackson, a
recent defender of conceptual analysis, has incorporated Quine’s, Putnam’s
and Kripke’s criticism19 of the impossibility of a stark dichotomy between
synthetic and analytic truths into his view of conceptual analysis. Jackson’s
defense of conceptual analysis lies in two core arguments: the argument that
we need conceptual analysis to locate the subject matter of our theorizing,
and the idea that there is only one kind of necessity although there are
two different ways of knowing it, namely “a priori” and “a posteriori.” In
other words, he rejects the view that the “a posteriori”/“a priori” distinction
produces more than one kind of necessity: the necessary “a priori” and the
necessary “a posteriori.”
Let us scrutinize these arguments. The first argument constitutes the justi-
fication of conceptual analysis. Jackson tells us that metaphysics is about what
the world is like and that the questions we ask are framed in a language.20
Thus a metaphysician would be unable to engage in serious metaphysics
by merely asking questions such as: “Are there Ks?” or “Are Ks nothing
over and above Js?” The question of “what counts as a K or a J” is prior
to other questions that follow it. The metaphysician first needs to locate
or identify the subject matter. According to Jackson, our starting point is
our ordinary conception of K or J, and it can be extracted by appealing to
our intuitions about possible cases. Let us suppose that I need to extract
the ordinary conception of free action; to do this, I appeal to my intuitions
about free action. I am thereafter able to describe an action as free because
I am guided by my intuitions about various possible cases and can attempt
to determine whether there are cases of free action. My intuitions about
possible cases reveal my theory of free action, and your intuitions reveal
your theory. To the extent that our intuitions coincide, they reveal our shared the-
ory. To the extent that our intuitions coincide with those of the folk, they reveal the
folk theory.21Jackson makes an important disclaimer concerning the use of
the word “concept.” The purpose of conceptual analysis is to reach clarity
about the cases covered by the words rather than the word per se, and Jack-
son differentiates conceptual analysis from word or sentence analysis.22 The
task that Jackson undertakes is to elucidate concepts by determining how
subjects classify possibilities, and he emphasizes that conceptual analysis is
an hypothetical-deductive exercise. This can be understood as meaning that
18. In legal theory, Brian Leiter has argued that conceptual analysis in jurisprudence is not
immune from Quine’s criticism. He claims, however, that analytical jurisprudence theorists
have ignored the criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction. See B. Leiter, Realism, Positivism
and Conceptual Analysis, in 4 LEGAL THEORY 533–547, at 546 (1998).
19. W. Quine Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in CLARITY IS NOT ENOUGH (H.D. Lewis, ed., 1963);
Saul Kripke, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1972); Hilary Putnam, MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY (1975).
20. Frank Jackson, FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS 30 (1998) (hereinafter “ME ”).
21. Id. at 32.
22. Id. at 33–34.
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we are seeking the hypothesis that makes best sense of a person’s responses
to possible cases, taking into account all the evidence.23
Jackson’s second argument is the idea that there is only one kind of neces-
sity and that the necessary “a posteriori” does not require acknowledging
additional kinds of necessity. By contrast, critics of the “a priori” have ar-
gued that we might say that water = water or H2O = H2O is analytically or
conceptually necessary, whereas water = H2O is metaphysically necessary.
This means that there are two kinds of necessity. If this view is sound, then
the necessity of water being H2O is not available a priori, because what is
conceptually possible or impossible is available to reason alone, and what
is metaphysically possible and impossible cannot be known through reason
alone. Therefore, the knowledge that water = H2O can be achieved only “a
posteriori.”
Jackson rejects this argument and claims that the necessity of water =
H2O is not different from the necessity that water = water. His defense lies
in two core arguments. First, he advocates an Occamist view and argues
that we should not multiply the senses of necessity beyond need.24 Thus
the necessary a posteriori can be explained in terms of one unitary notion
of a set of possible worlds. Second, he advances the idea of the Twin Earth
and states that to describe a counterfactual world, such as the Twin Earth,
we need to look at the actual world. Moreover, the actual world plays an
important role in determining the correct way to describe counterfactual
possible worlds. Let us scrutinize both arguments.
There are two different ways of evaluating linguistic expressions relative
to possible worlds. These in turn give rise to different intensions (and dif-
ferent extensions in nonactual worlds). The first way is the original way
adopted by possible-world semanticists since the inception of the subject.
Given the actual use of an expression—say the use of “water” in the global
presence of actual water, that is, H2O—its intension is just the function as-
signing an extension to the expression in every possible world considered
counterfactually. The extension of the term in a possible world considered
counterfactually is what Jackson calls the “C-extension” of the term in that
world. And the correlative intension is the “C-intension.” Now, it turns out
that because of the rigidity of “water,” its C-intension is a constant function
across water-containing counterfactual worlds in the sense that “water” ap-
plies to water, that is, to H2O, in any such world and otherwise applies to
nothing.
The second way of evaluating linguistic expressions relative to possible
worlds is to consider possible worlds as actual contexts of use of the ex-
pression in question. The basic idea is that we do not consider “water” as
used in the actual world and then go on to consider what it applies to it in
counterfactual worlds, given its actual use. What we do, rather, is consider
23. Id. at 36.
24. Id. at 70–71.
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what “water” applies to as usual in possible worlds considered as actual con-
texts of use. This generates a different (nonactual) intension.25 For presum-
ably, in any world in which water is used in the global presence of a substance
that plays the same role in the interactions of speakers with their environ-
ment as H2O plays in our interactions with ours, “water” will apply to that
substance, whatever it is. Given a relevant world x and a relevant substance in
that world, the substance in question is what Jackson calls the “A-extension”
of “water” in x. And the “A-intension” is just the function from possible
worlds, considered as actual contexts of use of “water,” to A-extensions. So
in possible worlds considered as actual, “water” will pick out whatever sub-
stance in those worlds is relevantly superficially similar to water in the actual
world. It will pick out whatever watery substance plays the same role vis-a`-vis
the everyday interactions of agents with their environment as the role played
by water in the actual world.
What has all this to do with conceptual analysis? Suppose we identify
concepts with intensions. Conceptual analysis originally sought to uncover
the nature of concepts, understood as C-intensions, by revealing their en-
tailment relations with one another. However, as Quine and Putnam have
taught us, such an enterprise is hopeless to the extent that it relies on the
contentious rendition of the analytic-synthetic distinction. It turns out that
C-intensions depend on what the world is actually like, and no amount of
analysis can reveal that all on its own. This hopeless project is what Jackson
calls “ambitious conceptual analysis.” Nonambitious conceptual analysis be-
gins by identifying concepts with A-intensions. These concepts and their
entailment relations do not depend on what the world is like. They depend
on the roles things play in agents’ interactions with their environment, the
folk theories they happen to uphold, and so on. And Jackson considers
conceptual analysis of the nonambitious sort to be both immune from the
usual criticisms of traditional conceptual analysis and indispensable to meta-
physics.
Jackson also points out that when a term’s A-extension and C-extension
differ, there is a difference between the epistemic status of a term’s
A-extension and its C-extension. He explains it as follows:
The point is that in order to pick out water in a counterfactual world, we need
to know something about relationships between the counterfactual world and
the actual world that we could only know after discovering that in the actual
world H2O plays the watery role. By contrast, we did not know the A-extension
of water at every world, for its A-extension does not depend on the nature of
the actual world. For the A-extension of T at a world w is the extension of T at
w given w is the actual world, and so does not depend on whether or not w is
in fact the actual world. What we can know independently of what the actual
world is like can properly be called a priori. The sense in which conceptual
analysis involves the a priori is that it concerns A-extensions at worlds, and
25. Id. at 49.
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so A-intensions, and accordingly concerns something that does, or does not,
obtain independently of how things actually are.26
Furthermore, Jackson points out that we find our way around buildings
by hearing or reading sentences that we understand, such as “The seminar
room is around the corner on the left.” There are many places and possibil-
ities, but by reading or hearing the sentence and by virtue of understanding
it, we know which possibility is actual. He argues that we have a folk theory
that ties together understanding, truth, and information about possibilities
and that the obvious way to articulate this folk theory is knowing in which
possible worlds it is true or false.27 However, he tells us, we understand some
sentences without knowing the conditions under which they are true, in one
sense of the condition under which they are true.28 He puts the following
example: I understand the proposition “He has a beard,” but I do not know
the truth-conditions of this proposition because I do not know who is be-
ing spoken of.29 In other words, we can understand certain sentences by
knowing how the proposition expressed depends on context, and it is not
necessary to know the sentence’s truth-conditions. Jackson asserts that to
know how the proposition expressed depends on context is to know truth-conditions in
another sense of a sentence’s truth-conditions.30
Jackson argues that there are two superficially different but essentially
identical accounts of the necessary “a posteriori,” and he states this as follows:
Thus, we have two superficially different but essentially identical accounts of
the necessary a posteriori. One says a sentence like water = H2O gets to be a nec-
essary a posteriori because the proposition it expresses is necessary, but which
proposition this is needs to be known in order to understand the sentence,
and is an a posteriori matter depending on the nature of the actual world.
Little wonder then that it takes empirical work and not just understanding, to
see that the proposition expressed and, thereby, the sentence, is [sic] neces-
sary. The other says that there are two propositions connected with a sentence
like “water = H2O,” and the sentence counts as necessary if the C-proposition
is necessary, but, as understanding the sentence only requires knowing the
A-proposition, little wonder that understanding alone is not enough to see
that the sentence is necessary. The important point for us is that both stories
can be told in terms of one set of possible worlds.31
The former discussion illuminates and clarifies Jackson’s distinction
between ambitious and nonambitious conceptual analysis. He advocates the
idea that fallibility can be reconciled with the “a priori” and that conceptual
26. Id. at 51.
27. Id. at 71.
28. Id. at 72.
29. Id. at 73.
30. Id. at 75.
31. Id. at 77.
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analysis should be practiced in its modest or nonambitious role. In other
words, analysis about possibilities should not play a big role in determining
what the world is like, and thus conceptual analysis cannot determine the
fundamental nature of our world. Indeed, on the contrary, conceptual anal-
ysis is the activity of describing in less fundamental terms, given an account
of the world stated in more fundamental terms.32 This distinction will be
elaborated further in the following section.
What is clear is that conceptual analysis is an “a priori” task although this
does not mean that the result is not informative. The aim of conceptual
analysis is not only to understand but also to explain properties, things,
states of affairs, and events in the world. If some of the things said in one
vocabulary can be said in another more basic or fundamental vocabulary,
then the analyst is given a description in terms of new properties, state of
affairs, events, and so on of the concept subject to analysis. Conceptual
analysis is, consequently, informational and it should not be, according to
Jackson, ambitious.
II. STAVROPOULOS’S APPROACH TO HART’S SEMANTICS
AS CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Stavropoulos’s characterization of conceptual analysis differs in two ways
from the view discussed above. First, he says that conceptual analysis “aims
at articulating the existing common understanding of the terms whose ex-
tension constitutes the field of inquiry”33. The underlying argument, ac-
cording to Stavropoulos, is that I need to mean by the words I use what
everyone else does; otherwise my substantive claim will miss its target.34
Conceptual analysis, Stavropoulos tells us, is about the explication of the
ordinary conception of a concept, and he asserts that this ordinary concep-
tion is represented by “folk theory.”35 He also asserts that Hart’s analysis
aims to fit “folk theory.”36 Second, Stavropoulos, inspired by Jackson, makes
an important distinction between ambitious and nonambitious conceptual
analysis. According to Stavropoulos, Hart’s conceptual analysis is ambitious
because it supposes that usage alone determines the correct understanding
of concepts.37According to this view, an analysis is successful “in virtue of its
fitting actual usage.”38
I raise a criticism of Stavropoulos’s characterization of Hart’s seman-
tics as conceptual analysis and argue that either in terms of Jackson’s
32. Id. at 44.
33. Stavropoulos, HS at 70.
34. Id. at 71.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 71–72.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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understanding of ambitious conceptual analysis or in Stavropoulos’s terms,
Hart’s semantics is nonambitious conceptual analysis.
Conceptual analysis, Stavropoulos tells us, is committed “to elucidating
the understanding inherent in the ordinary, day-to-day use of the term
and reflection about the things it designates.”39 To make his point clearer,
Stavropoulos claims:
It is not interesting, and perhaps not even sensible, the argument goes, to say
that beliefs as I understand the term are neuro-chemical episodes. Rather, for
my claim to have any philosophical importance it must be the case that beliefs
in the sense common to all thinkers are what I say they are.40
At the end of this passage, Stavropoulos quotes Jackson in From Meta-
physics to Ethics, but Stavropoulos’s view differs from the one advanced.
Jackson41 suggests metaphysics is about what the world is like. But, he
argues, the questions we ask when we do metaphysics are framed in a
language.42 He tells us that we would not go very far if we fail to attend
to the representational properties of our terms.43 Jackson goes on to argue
that arbitrary stipulative definitions—such as that belief is any information-
carrying state that causes subjects to utter sentences like “I believe that
snow is white”—tend to turn interesting philosophical debates into easy
exercises in deductions from stipulative definitions together with accepted
facts.44 Similarly, the stipulative definition that a belief is a neurochemi-
cal episode turns interesting philosophical questions such as the reducibil-
ity of mental states to nonmental states into a trivial exercise, since these
definitions are not neutral and are therefore theory-laden. Jackson argues
that we should resort to our ordinary conception of notions like “belief ”
or “free action” to define our subject qua metaphysicians.45 Jackson then
asks:
But how we should identify our ordinary conception? The only possible answer,
I think , is by appeal to what seems to us most obvious and central about free
action, determinism, belief, or whatever, as revealed by our intuitions about
possible cases. Intuitions about how various cases, including various merely
possible cases, are correctly described in terms of free action, determinism,
and belief are precisely what reveal our ordinary conception of free action,
determinism, and belief, or, as it is often put nowadays, our folk theory of
them.46
39. Id. at 70.
40. Id. at 70.
41. Jackson, ME at 31.
42. Id. at 30.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 31.
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According to this passage, our ordinary conception of concepts constitutes
our folk theory of them. This is quite different from Stavropoulos’s view
of folk theory that it is “not the set of actual beliefs about the nature of
the things designated by expressions; rather, it is the theory that users, or a
subset of them must have, given how they apply the expression in ordinary
contexts and in thought experiments.”47
We need to assess whether Hart’s conceptual analysis fits Stavropoulos’s
characterization of conceptual analysis as being a “folk theory” that is re-
vealed by our word usage. Stavropoulos holds that it will be sufficient if it
can be shown that conceptual analysis, according to Hart, is concerned with
articulating the understanding implicit in the ordinary use of words of a
subset of users such as lawyers.48 Moreover, Stavropoulos claims:
Hart treats ordinary use as a source of theoretical knowledge. He thinks, in
other words, that attention to use will sharpen our understanding of the con-
cepts that figure in use, and so provide insight into the nature of the things
the concepts designate. Moreover, he seems to suggest that collecting the data
of use should not be particularly difficult. He says that we can dissolve many
persistent problems by looking at how words are ordinarily used. The under-
standing implicit in use must be manifest, for Hart, in the behavior of users.
So the data he has in mind must be widely and easily available, not hidden
or requiring substantial theoretical machinery for their retrieval and employ-
ment in the service of philosophical explanation. He is after, so to speak, the
surface data of ordinary discourse.49
In this passage, Stavropoulos is examining Hart’s work “Jhering’s Heaven
of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence,”50 in which he approves
Wittgenstein’s dictum that we must look at concepts when they are “at work,”
not when they are “idling” or on “holiday.” This is the only proof used by
Stavropoulos to show that Hart advocates the analysis of ordinary discourse.
According to Stavropoulos, Hart considers that the actual usage of gen-
eral terms is guided by implicit principles or rationales that need explicit
articulation.51 The principles that Hart seeks, Stavropoulos tells us, are sup-
posed to reveal the deeper rationale of rules of conventional use.52
Hart often argues that word usage is either misleading or insufficient to
understand or explain the nature of legal concepts. Hart tells us that there
are three recurrent issues in jurisprudence: How does law differ from, and
how is it related to, orders backed by threats? How does legal obligation
47. Stavropoulos, HS at 70–71. In this paper, thought experiments, counterfactual situa-
tions, and possible cases are taken as being interchangeable.
48. Id. at 71.
49. Id. at 72.
50. Hart, Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 265–277 (1983).
51. Stavropoulos, HS at 73.
52. Id.
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differ from, and how it is related to, moral obligation? What are rules and to
what extent is law an affair of rules?53 He then argues that one way to dispel
doubts and perplexity about these issues is to resort to a definition through
a typical use-based semantics, which provides an analysis of the day-to-day
use of the word in question. However, he claims that even expert lawyers
find it difficult to give a definition in this form of legal concepts. They
sense important distinctions between, for example, morality and law, but
they cannot explain these distinctions.54 Similarly, we recognize an elephant
when we see it but cannot resort to our day-to-day use to draw the necessary
lines and define it. Hart denies that the purpose of the analysis of legal
concepts is to provide a rule by reference to which the correctness of the
use of the words can be tested. His interest is in law, coercion, and morality
as types of legal phenomena,55 the purpose of which is to advance legal theory
by providing an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal
legal system.56 To resort to the usage of words, Hart tell us, in disputes such
as that between natural-law lawyers and positivists on the legal responsibility
of German officials during the Nazi regime can disguise the nature of the
disagreement and is usually verbally ill-presented:
Neither side to the dispute would be content if they were told: “Yes, you are
right, the correct way in English (or in German) of putting that sort of point
is to say what you have said.” So, though the positivists might point to a weight
of English usage, showing that there is no contradiction in asserting that a
rule of law is too iniquitous to be obeyed, and that it does not follow from the
proposition that a rule is too iniquitous to obey that it is not a valid rule of
law, their opponents will hardly regard this as disposing of the case. Plainly we
cannot grapple adequately with this issue if we see it as one concerning the
proprieties of linguistic usage. For what really is at stake is the comparative
merit of a wider and a narrower concept or way of classifying rules, which
belong to a system of rules generally effective in social life. If we are to make a
reasoned choice between these concepts, it must be because one is superior to
the other in the way in which it will assist our theoretical inquiries, or advance
and clarify our moral deliberations, or both.57
Hart emphasizes the usage of words, but the correctness of this depends
on the phenomenon to be described or explained. Consequently, for him it
is not the case that the phenomenon is correctly explained through a study
of the usage of the words. For instance, Hart informs us that the starting
point of Austin’s analysis is the concept of “being obliged”: a gunman orders
his victim to hand over his wallet and threatens to shoot him if he refuses, if
53. Hart, CL at 13.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 204–205.
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the victim complies, we say that the victim was “obliged” to do so.58 The use
of this word is correct because it fits the phenomenon we aim to describe.
So as to the main purpose of his book The Concept of Law, Hart claims that
it is to elucidate the distinction between primary rules of obligation and
secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication, and the union of
the two may be regarded as the “essence” of law though they may not always
be found together wherever the word “law” is correctly used. He asserts that
their union has a great explanatory power.59 Hart tells us that the use of the
words “justice” and “morality” might be misleading. These words are used as
coextensive. However, in his view, “justice” should have a more prominent
place in the criticism of legal arrangements.60
Two examples used by Hart to exercise his conceptual analysis and show
that word usage cannot help us in the task of elucidating the nature of our
legal concepts are worth mentioning. First, he asks whether the common
wider usage of the words “international law” is likely to obstruct any practical
or theoretical aim.61 His response is positive. Hart argues that the word
“sovereign” is associated with the idea of a person above the law but it is a bad
guide to understand the concept of “international law” since it consequently
causes confusion in the theory of international law.62 Hart then corrects the
common usage of the word “sovereign” and argues that it refers instead to
“independent,” as in the sentence “a sovereign state is one not subject to
certain types of control, and its sovereignty is that area of conduct in which
it is autonomous.”63
Second, Hart uses conceptual analysis to elicit our intuitions through pos-
sible cases, rather than through our word usage, in his explanation of the
concept of legitimate legislative authority. He considers the argument that
to the extent that participants of a community have the habit of obedience
to a rule which comes from a particular authority, we can say that this person
or body has an authority to legislate. Hart shows us through possible legal
worlds that that habit of obedience to a rule is neither a sufficient nor a nec-
essary condition of legislative authority, and many legal theorists and lawyers
agree with Hart’s conceptual analysis of legislative authority because it fits
our intuitions about what an authority to legislate is; their agreement is not
due to our word usage. Hart imagines a possible legal world in which Rex
I’s rules are habitually obeyed and he may, therefore be called a “legislator.”
Suppose, however, that a revolution takes place and that society ceases its
rule. It may happen during Rex I’s lifetime or at the point of transition to a
new Rex II. Consequently, either Rex I will lose or Rex II will not acquire the
right to legislate. Hart argues that mere habit is not sufficient to guarantee
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 151.
60. Id. at 153.
61. Id. at 209.
62. Id. at 216.
63. Id. at 217.
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Rex II’s right to legislate. Therefore there should be a critical reflective atti-
tude to certain patterns of behavior as a common standard, and this should
display itself in criticism, demands for conformity, and acknowledgments
that such criticism and demands are justified. Hart asserts:
Consideration of the simple legal worlds of Rex I and Rex II is perhaps enough
to show that the continuity of legislative authority which characterizes most
legal systems depends on that form of social practice which constitutes the
acceptance of a rule, and differs, in the ways we have indicated, from the
simpler facts of mere habitual obedience. . . . Even if we concede that a person,
such as Rex, whose general orders are habitually obeyed, may be called a
legislator and his orders laws, habits of obedience to each of a succession of
such legislators are not enough to account for the right of a successor to succeed
and for the consequent continuity in legislative power. First, because habits are
not “normative”; they cannot confer rights or authority on anyone. Secondly,
because habits of obedience to one individual cannot, though accepted rules
can, refer to class or line of future successive legislators as well as to the current
legislator, or render obedience to them likely.64
This passage shows how Hart makes his case for eliciting our intuitions
about legislative authority and how his interest does not merely focus on
word usage or on the rationale of conventional rules. You and I do not
necessarily agree on shared criteria for applying the concepts of “obedience”
or “authority.” You and I probably disagree on the criteria for applying the
concept “habit” or “obedience.” For example, I think that there are examples
of “obedience” such as the sacrifice of Abraham to God or Saint Therese to
her conscience, but nonetheless you agree on the first and disagree on the
latter example. We nevertheless have a fruitful and “genuine” disagreement.
Thus the purpose of conceptual analysis, according to Hart, is to reach
agreement on our common conception and not on our common usage. In
summary, it is possible to conclude that Stavropoulos’s arguments are weak
and cannot show that Hart relies on usage as the standard of correctness of
conceptual analysis. To succeed in his argumentation, Stavropoulos needs
to show that the examples above are “really” cases of word usage65 rather
than cases of eliciting our intuitions and common understanding, although
this is a rather difficult task.
However, the core criticism of Stavropoulos’s approach is his assertion
that Hart’s semantics as conceptual analysis is an ambitious one. Stavropou-
los’s distinction between ambitious and nonambitious conceptual analysis
differs from the one advanced by Jackson, who claims that modest concep-
tual analysis should prevail. According to Stavropoulos, Hart’s conceptual
64. Id. at 58.
65. Our interpretation is consistent with similar ideas advocated by authors such as Cole-
man. He claims that Hart’s aim is not to report on usage, but to analyze the concept of law. See
Coleman, supra note 5, at 177).
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analysis is ambitious because it presupposes that use alone determines the
correct understanding of the target concept.66 This means that analysis is
true in virtue of its fitting actual usage.67Moreover, “ambitious analysis seeks
to articulate a standard to which ordinary use is responsible, which is drawn
from ordinary use. Such a standard is supposed to be derived from the
data of actual usage—the applications of the expression made by ordinary
users, the explications of its meaning offered by them and the procedure
and abilities of users.”68 But ambitious analysis also aspires to order usage
on the basis of a common ground, which is constructed as an idealization.
Thus ambitious analysis seeks coherence in words’ usage and for its cor-
rectness does not need something independent of their use.69 The applica-
tions most users are disposed to make and the judgments of application on
which most agree “are secure from discounting.” 70 According to Stavropoulos,
Hart’s analysis respects actual usage and therefore it accepts the judgments
that are firmly in place and widely shared, and the more prevalent appli-
cations, defining status. Stavropoulos tells us that this common ground as
a benchmark of correctness commits Hart’s analysis to the idea of shared
criteria:
Ambitious analysis, therefore, uses the common ground as a benchmark of
correctness, on the basis of which individual mistake, irrespective of its sources
and character—whether the result of incomplete understanding or general
epistemic handicap—is defined as such. Given that the common ground is the
standard of correctness, ambitious analysis is committed to there being and to
its aiming at articulating shared criteria, i.e., the procedures and rules shared
among users and used for supporting their judgments of application of the
term.71
Thus Stavropoulos suggests that if I disagree on the meaning of the word
“obligation” and most other users agree on it, then I will be treated as being
confused. Ambitious analysis, consequently, precludes a further and inter-
esting possibility, namely that instead of having a defective understanding
of “obligation,” my concept of obligation is the result of an unorthodox
theory of what obligation really is.72 It therefore precludes theoretical dis-
agreements, which means the possibility of individuals having different con-
ceptions of a concept.
Since we have shown that Hart did not merely rely on the primacy of word
usage in analyzing legal concepts, it follows that Hart’s semantics, as con-
ceptual analysis, cannot be characterized as ambitious in the way described
66. Stavropoulos, HS at 72–73.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 74.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 75.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 79.
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by Stavropoulos. Hart argues that a mere habit of obedience cannot explain
legislative authority, because a possible case—Rex I and Rex II—has shown
that the habit of obeying the law or the law of a particular authority can-
not guarantee the right to legislate to successive authorities. The basis of
Hart’s arguments is not common users’ rules and procedures. Instead he
appeals to our common intuitions about “authority,” “obedience,” and the
“right to legislate.” We agree with Hart because his explanation is powerful
and fits our intuitions, together with the fact that we accept that rules have
an internal aspect which is constituted by a critical reflective attitude. We
reckon that habit is not sufficient to define authority because habit is not
a normative concept, and if you disagree with me and argue that habit is
a normative concept, then you need to provide possible cases to make me
aware of the kind of intuitions that you wish to make apparent and which
may contradict my former insights. In other words, we seek clarification of
our concepts in order to reach a common explanation of legal phenomena.
The key issue is whether we think that our intuitions alone can determine
the nature of our concepts. This is, according to Jackson’s view, ambitious
conceptual analysis.
Jackson’s notion of conceptual analysis differs substantively from that of
Stavropoulos since it is both much more interesting and rich and can consti-
tute a powerful criticism of Hart’s semantics as conceptual analysis. Concep-
tual analysis has an immodest role, because Moorean facts—our intuitions—
and our folk theory carry an important weight in an argument on the nature
of the world. However, Jackson criticizes conceptual analysis in its immod-
est role on the ground that it gives intuitions about possibilities too much
significance in determining what the world is like.73
Let us, for instance, consider the concept of “justice.” Our intuitions tell us
that justice requires inter alia that like cases should, prima facie, be treated
alike. Conceptual analysis in its modest role considers that the question
about the resemblances and differences applying to the general principle
of justice is a substantive matter. This means that the criteria of relevant
resemblances and differences may often vary with the fundamental moral
outlook of a given person or society. It must then require substantive argu-
ments to show that if, for example, a law provides for the relief of poverty,
the requirement of the principle “to treat like cases alike” necessitates at-
tention to the needs of different claimants of relief. Sometimes what are
required are the capacities of persons for a specific function with which the
exercise of the law in question may be concerned.74 The claim is that “a
priori,” given the conceptual analysis of the concept “justice,” “like cases
should be treated alike.” It is a matter of substantive argument to give con-
tent to this principle. The matter of content is, therefore, an “a posteriori”
issue.
73. Jackson, ME at 43–44.
74. Hart, CL at 159.
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By contrast, conceptual analysis in its immodest role argues that the prin-
ciple “to treat like cases alike” really should be defined “a priori,” eliciting
our intuitions of what justice really requires. It is claimed here that Hart ad-
vocates conceptual analysis in its modest role. Thus he argues that analysis
of the concept of justice is complex. Conceptual analysis, Hart tells us, of the
concept of justice is much more complex than the analysis of concepts such
as “genuine,” “tall,” or “warm,”75 because the standard of relevant resem-
blance between different cases not only varies with the type of subject, “but
may be often open to challenge even in relation to a single type of subject.”76
Thus we might all agree that justice means the requirement that like cases
be treated alike, but there are resemblances and differences among individ-
uals that the law must recognize if its rules are to treat like cases alike and so
be just. “Fundamental differences, in general moral and political outlook,
may lead to irreconcilable differences and disagreements as to what charac-
teristics of human beings are to be taken as relevant to the criticism of law
as unjust.”77 Here conceptual analysis cannot help us, and only substantive
arguments can defend one view in favor of another.
As stated in the introduction to this piece, two methodological claims in
the Concept of Law have produced perplexity: that it is a book on “analytic
jurisprudence,” and that it may also be regarded as an essay in “descriptive
sociology.” Are the two ideas of conceptual analysis and descriptive sociol-
ogy reconcilable? The answer to this puzzle lies, I claim, in the notion of
nonambitious conceptual analysis. The theorist analyzes concepts but ac-
cepts the limitations of conceptual analysis and therefore uses empirical
knowledge and substantive arguments to explain, refine, or perhaps refute
initial insights provided by intuitions. He makes “a priori” claims about
the relationships between legal concepts such as “law,” “rule-governed be-
havior,” and “morality,” then he considers substantive arguments to refine
and organize these conceptual associations. Jackson calls this methodology
“analytical descriptivism” to distinguish it from other descriptivist tasks in
normative fields such as ethical naturalism, where conceptual analysis is re-
jected and replaced by naturalized epistemology.78 Perhaps we should call
Hart’s methodology analytical legal descriptivism.
75. It is arguable, against Hart’s view, that he cannot justify the idea that empirical concepts
are less complex than concepts such as “justice.” However, it can be agued that it is easier to
reach agreement on what is “warm” or “tall” in controversial cases than on what is “just” in
contestable cases.
76. Hart, CL at 156.
77. Id. at 157.
78. Brian Leiter uses naturalized epistemology as a methodology for jurisprudence. See
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. (1997).
My article, Genuine Disagreements: A Realist Reconstruction of Dworkin, 4 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL
STUDIES (2001), resorts to naturalized epistemology to reconstruct Dworkin’s legal theory in
realist terms.
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III. A CHARITABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE SEMANTIC
STING ARGUMENT: THE SEMANTIC PROPERTIES TEST
Stavropoulos delineates the argumentative route that is needed for a full
defence of the semantic sting argument. Dworkin and his rejoinders must
show that Hart’s semantics theory advocates shared criteria for applying a
concept. They must then clarify concepts of “shared” and “criteria” and show
that Hart’s semantics advocates these claims whatever content they might
have. This task, for reasons already pointed to, is not simple. Hart’s semantics
as conceptual analysis does not presuppose the notion of “shared criteria”
and therefore, if Stavropoulos’s purpose is to show that Hart’s semantics as
conceptual analysis makes his legal theory vulnerable to the semantic sting
argument, Stavropoulos has failed for the reasons exposed above.
There is, however, an important methodological intuition in Dworkin’s
semantic sting argument which proves insightful when inserted into a sound
theoretical framework. It is argued that Dworkin’s intuition is that semantics,
the study of the relationship between our language and the world, should
not determine the properties79 of our concepts.80 Consequently, it is possible
to have genuine disagreements about the nature or the properties of our
concepts without having “shared criteria.” This assertion will be clarified
in the following paragraphs. Thus it is proposed that the semantic sting
argument will be refined in the light of what is called the semantic properties
test argument, an argument that preserves the spirit of the semantic sting
argument. However, it is a more powerful theoretical framework than the
semantic sting argument, relying not on notions such as “shared criteria” but
instead on the idea of a traditional theory of meaning in which the meaning
of our words is the set of properties that a competent speaker associates with
the term.
Of course, to define a competent speaker we need to assume that the set of
properties that the speaker has identified is, in principle, identifiable by any
other competent speaker. For example, a speaker is defined as competent
because there is a set of properties, such as dangerous and animal, that
he associates with the term “tiger.” This is done “a priori,” since it is not
necessary to have the experience of a tiger to understand the set of properties
that applies to the term. As Jackson points out, we can learn to identify a tiger
through examples of what is not a tiger. Subsequently, “shared” properties
might be an important condition to assess competence, but they are not
79. I have argued in Genuine Disagreements (supra note 78) that a realist reconstruction of
Dworkin’s legal theory is a way of making sense of the distinction between theoretical and
semantic disagreements to eschew the criticism of semantic sophisticated models such as the
one advanced by Raz in Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law, see supra note 4. Realism
argues that ontological issues should be settled prior to semantical issues. I also argue, however,
that Dworkin’s reconstruction is incompatible with his ametaphysical view advocated in Truth
and Objectivity: You’d Better Believe It, PHIL. & PUB. AFF 25(2)(1996).
80. The notion of “properties of our concepts” refers to the features of the world that are
represented by the concept. It appeals to the representational function of concepts.
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necessarily so. One speaker might associate the term “good person” with
the property of “being generous,” and another speaker might not be able to
think of any property to identify the term “good person,” although he can
think of the life of Jesus as a good example and therefore infer that the
property of “humility” is applicable to the term. The two speakers do not have
“shared” properties or criteria but they can identify the concept in virtue of
a set of properties of what the concept is about.81 This interpretation is
consistent with Hart’s semantics as conceptual analysis.
Second, the semantic-properties-test argument asserts that an analysis of
the meaning of words enables us to determine the properties of our con-
cepts. Synonymity or paraphrasing82 is used to show how certain terms such
as “law” are related to other terms such as “rule-governed,” and how, as a re-
sult, these concepts have coextensive properties. Therefore, via conceptual
analysis—through verbal expressions—we elicit our intuitions about two dif-
ferent concepts and reveal that they are clearly related. We now know that
we can describe the concept “law” in terms of the concept “rule-governed”
and we can say with certainty that the properties of the concept “law” are
coextensive with the properties of the concept “rule-governed.” This is the
semantic test of properties. It uses semantics, for example conceptual anal-
ysis, to determine what properties are in the world and it is “a priori” since
it does not require actual experience or substantive argument to elucidate
the concept.
The objection to this view is as follows: if a theorist advocates the idea
that in order to determine the meaning of a term there must be a set of
properties that any competent speaker associates with it, he has to abandon
conceptual analysis, for the reason that an analysis of our terms does not
give us any information about the properties of our concepts. On the other
hand, if the theorist aims to preserve conceptual analysis, he needs to aban-
don this theory of meaning. A corollary of this view is a different version of
the semantic sting argument: here, even when two speakers identify a set of
properties associated with a term, conceptual analysis cannot tell us anything
about the properties of the two related concepts and the two speakers can
still have substantive disagreements about the properties or nature of the
concepts. For example, one speaker associates the term “law” with “the set of
norms emanating from a state,” and another competent speaker associates
“law” with “a norm that is just.” After having applied conceptual analysis,
we consider that “law” is associated with “rule-governed behavior” and “obli-
gation.” Consequently, according to the semantic properties test argument,
“rule-governed behavior” and “obligation” have coexisting properties.
The objection to this is that only substantive arguments can show that “law”
and “obligation” have the same properties or nature and that, therefore, an
81. See Raz, supra note 4, for a discussion of criterial semantic explanations that do not
presuppose the notion of “shared criteria.”
82. Jackson in ME argues that conceptual analysis is more about paraphrasing in the
Quinean sense than about synonymity.
A Defence of Hart’s Semantics as Nonambitious Conceptual Analysis 119
“a priori” analysis such as conceptual analysis cannot tell us the properties of
our concepts. It is argued here, however, that the kind of disagreement that
the conceptual analyst has is merely a semantic disagreement. This theorist
assumes that conceptual analysis throws light on the properties of concepts,
but this is a mistake. It cannot be done, runs the objection, because what
Kripke’s and Putnam’s model has shown is that descriptions of our terms
cannot determine the reference of our concepts. Thus, in both the Twin
Earth and the actual Earth the use and description of the term “water”
is potable and odorless liquid. However, in the Twin Earth water is XYZ,
whereas in the actual Earth water is H2O. Descriptions that are subjected
to conceptual analysis cannot determine the reference of our concepts.
Consequently only “a posteriori” arguments and discovery can reveal our
concepts. This objection is the semantic-properties-test argument.83
According to this revision of the semantic sting argument, we can have
“genuine” theoretical disagreements or substantive disagreements without
having a set of properties or criteria that applies to the concept. For instance,
we might not share a set of properties for applying the concept “art” but we
still have genuine disagreements about what is the nature of the concept
“art.” To associate “a priori” through conceptual analysis the term “art”
with “internal expression,” for example, assumes that these two terms have
coextensive properties. But substantive arguments, namely an “a posteriori”
inquiry, may reveal that there is no such neutral84 link and moreover that this
association reveals a modern theoretical conception of the concept “art.”85
IV. HART, CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS, AND THE STING:
A NONAMBITIOUS PROJECT
In the last section of this paper, let us attempt a defence of Hart’s seman-
tics as conceptual analysis using the semantic-properties-test argument. The
paper has so far argued that Hart’s analysis aims to clarify and understand
legal concepts but does not rely on our intuitions alone. On the contrary,
Hart’s analysis raises substantive arguments to explain the nature of legal
concepts and therefore represents a conceptual analysis in its modest role.
83. David Brink, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 160–161 (1989) gives a
detailed formulation of the semantic-properties-test argument. It is a variation of Moore’s open
argument in PRINCIPLIA ETHICA. It is also well explained in Harman, THE NATURE OF MORALITY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1977).
84. Hart in his reply to J. Cohen in “Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence,” In: Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, xxix (1955): 238, focuses on the importance of being neutral with
respect to different theoretical views.
85. Charles Taylor in THE SOURCES OF THE SELF (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1989),
argues that the modern turn towards an inner self, which began with St. Augustine, followed by
Descartes and Locke, explains the contemporary conception of art as a form of self-expression.
It is arguable, therefore, that “art” is not a neutral concept but that its definition depends on
the conception or theoretical framework presupposed by the theorist. Therefore the concept
“art” or “morality” is the result of fragmented conceptual frameworks. Nowadays this latter
radical assertion is seen as a commonplace in philosophical discussions.
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This argument ensures a plausible defence of Hart’s legal theory against the
semantic-properties-test argument.
As stated previously, Jackson’s approach to nonambitious conceptual anal-
ysis incorporates Quine’s86 and Kripke’s87 criticism of conceptual analysis.
According to Quine, conceptual analysis presupposes a clear dichotomy be-
tween analytic and synthetic truths. Quine has argued that this is a false
dichotomy. It is not possible to give a total description of the world inde-
pendently of our language or conceptual schemes. Nonetheless, concep-
tual analysis in its modest role does allow us to agree with Quine.88 Jackson
claims that the key issue in the analysis of our terms is not whether the terms
are synonymous but rather what Quine has called “paraphrasing,” namely
whether they give an “approximate fulfilment of the likely purposes of the
original sentences.”89 Take, for example, the concept of personal identity.
If we appeal to our intuitions, we are likely to propose that the concept “I”
or “myself” is different from “I” or “myself” as having causal continuity in
space and time. Locke has criticized our intuitions on this respect. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to formulate a concept of personal identity that fits
our substantive descriptions of “I,” such as “I will be punished,” “I should
be punished,” “I deserve this award,” and so on. Nonambitious conceptual
analysis accepts that our intuitions can be wrong.
Consider the analysis of the concept “socialism.” The concept is subject
to differences in America and in Europe. However, substantive research on
the concept “socialism” is likely to bring to light key elements that should
correct our “a priori” judgments about these differences. Consider, in ad-
dition, the case of “legislative authority.” Conceptual analysis tells us that
to have legislative authority a reflective critical attitude to the norm is re-
quired. However, let us suppose that substantive arguments show that this
reflective critical attitude is an evaluative point of view. Thus we may correct
our notion of legislative authority and argue that an evaluative critical point
of view is what is required to have “legislative authority.” But how do “a
priori” and “being fallible” coexist? As we explained in the previous section,
Jackson argues that if a term applies in a given world w, given or under the
supposition that w is the actual world, then we call this the “A-extension”
and the function assigning to each world the A-extension of terms in that
world is called the “A-intension” of the term. By contrast, if we refer to pos-
sible worlds, then the extension of the term is “C-extension” and the inten-
sion of the term in counterfactual worlds is “C-intension.” We learned from
Kripke that for a term such as “water,” the C-intension is not the same as the
A-intension, whereas for words such as “square,” the A-intension is the same
as the C-intension. According to Jackson, we also learn from Kripke that in
86. See Quine, supra note 19.
87. See Kripke, supra note 19.
88. Jackson, ME at 44.
89. Id. at 45.
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order to know something about the C-extension, we need to know about
the actual world:
The point is not that we did not know the essence of water—we rarely know
the essence of the things our words denote; the point is that in order to pick
out water in the counterfactual world, we need to know something about
relationships between the counterfactual world and the actual world that we
could only know after discovering that in the actual world H2O plays the watery
role.90
By contrast, knowledge of the A-extension does not depend on the nature
of the actual world. What we know independently of knowing what the actual
world is like can properly be called “a priori.” Conceptual analysis has two
“a priori” parts. First, the part concerned with the A-intensions of various
terms, and second the part concerned with whether the A-intensions and
the C-intensions of various terms differ.91
In his criticism of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, Quine asserts that
there are no genuinely analytical “a priori” sentences. Jackson argues that
the use of language and the ability to express how things are require repre-
sentational devices which effect a partition among possibilities in the world.
According to Quine, we can never detach our conceptual schemes and how
things are. Mooreans, by contrast, tell us that we can effect a partition be-
tween language and thought,92 and conceptual analysis adheres to the no-
tion that we are able to distinguish between what is very confidently believed
and that which our confident belief is about. According to conceptual anal-
ysis, our starting point is our way of describing things and our knowledge
of what is familiar to us and consequently we are able to reject certain fan-
tastic possibilities and can assert that our ordinary conception of “law” is
revealed by our intuitions. This is not to assert that these boundaries cannot
be moved. On the contrary, it has been shown that substantive arguments
should play a role in the correcting of these intuitions.
Hart’s Concept of Law is, I claim, an example of nonambitious conceptual
analysis. It can be defined as conceptual analysis because Hart aims to clar-
ify our concepts, because these concepts have representational properties,93
90. Id. at 50.
91. Id. at 52.
92. Id. at 52–55.
93. This is an important point that Stavropoulos misses. He asserts that Hart’s semantics
has metaphysical consequences (HS at 64) that introduce a tension since “on the one hand,
Hart professes to seek metaphysical insight from the way words are used; on the other, he says
that the rules governing use will not take us far enough in the metaphysical inquiry” (HS at 69).
Stavropoulos overlooks the fact that it is not our word usage that enables us to understand the
metaphysical consequences of our language, it is instead the representational properties of our
words. Consequently, there is no such tension in Hart. Stavropoulos points out that according
to Hart, inquiry in use-based semantics will not take us far enough; we need to look at the
things, events, or state of affairs represented by our language. However, it is doubtful whether
these things, events, or state of affairs do have, according to Hart, a robust metaphysical status.
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and because they tell us what is covered by the concept.94 Similar concepts
have similar vocabularies because they designate things or events with com-
mon features.95 The structure of our thought and language, and therefore
the way we describe the world and each other, reflects truths about human
nature, such as the instinct of self-preservation.96 Conceptual analysis also
shows that the existence of differences between social phenomena such as
mere convergence of behavior and social rules can be shown linguistically.97
Hart asserts that general terms are used to classify both features of human
life and the world in which we live98 and he informs us that we are not
looking merely at words but at the realities we use words to talk about.99 He
aims at understanding the relationships between one type of phenomena
to which we apply words and other types of phenomena.100 Hart insists that
what is required is a description of how a statement of the form “X has a
right . . . ” is related to facts and to legal rules.101 However. Hart’s concep-
tual analysis does not claim that a mere understanding of our concepts “a
priori” will ensure an understanding of the phenomena; in other words,
that a mere analysis of our concepts will cast light on the properties of our
concepts. Therefore, we assert, Hart’s conceptual analysis is nonambitious.
Three examples shall well illustrate the point. First, Hart rejects the idea
that the nature of international law can be inferred “a priori” from the
concept of sovereignty of the state. He argues that we need to examine the
actual rules and points out: “there is no way of knowing what sovereignty
states have, till we know what are the forms of international law and whether
or not they are mere empty forms.”102 Second, Hart’s reply to skeptical views
that claim that sanctions are a necessary condition of municipal systems and
a fortiori they are also a necessary condition of international law is that there
are substantive arguments to defend the idea that sanctions do not play a
central role in characterizing international law and therefore no simple
deduction can be made from the concept of municipal law to the central
features of international law:
This is so because aggression between states is very unlike that between in-
dividuals. To initiate a war is, even for the strongest power, to risk much for
an outcome which is rarely predictable with reasonable confidence. On the
other hand, because of the inequality of the states, there can be no standing
Hart insists, in the CONCEPT OF LAW, on evading metaethical or metaphysical formulations due
to the difficulties and subtleties involved in these issues. (CL at 164).
94. Hart, CL at 168.
95. Id. at 168.
96. Id. at 188.
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id.
101. Hart, “Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence,” see supra, note 84 at 246.
102. Hart, CL at 218.
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assurance that the combined strength of those on the side of international
order is likely to preponderate over the powers tempted to aggression. Hence
the organization and use of sanctions may involve fearful risks and the threat
of them add little to the natural deterrents. Against this very different back-
ground of fact, international law has developed in a form different from that
of municipal law. When the rules are disregarded, it is not on the footing that
they are not “binding” instead efforts are made to conceal the facts. It may
of course be said that such rules are efficacious only so far as they concern
issues over which states are unwilling to fight. This may be so, and may reflect
adversely on the importance of the system and its value to humanity. Yet that
even so much may be secured shows that no simple deduction can be made
from the necessity of organized sanctions to municipal law, in its setting of
physical and psychological facts, to the conclusion that without them interna-
tional law, in its very different setting, imposes no obligation, is not “binding,”
and so not worth the title of “law.”103
Third, Hart argues that the “a priori” claim that states can be bound only by
self-imposed obligations has too little respect for facts. He suggests that only
an empirical research of the actual practice of states can show which view is
the correct one.104 He gives two examples in which international obligations
arise though there is no consent of the party bound. The first is the case
of a new state, such as Iraq in 1932 and Israel in 1948. After emergence,
both states were bound by the general obligations of international law. The
second case is that of a state acquiring territory or undergoing change, such
as the acquisition of maritime territory, where the state is subject to rules
relating to territorial waters and the high seas.105
CONCLUSION
This study has argued that Hart’s semantics does not fall prey to the seman-
tic sting argument, which is one of the most important challenges to Hart’s
legal theory advanced by Dworkin. We have scrutinized Stavropoulos’s argu-
ments, which aim to strength Dworkin’s view by claiming that Hart’s seman-
tics involves shared criteria for applying a concept and relies on a use-based
semantics. According to Hart, our ordinary conception is revealed by our
words’ usage. Yet it is argued that Stavropoulos conflates ordinary concep-
tion and ordinary usage. On the other hand, it is apparent, in opposition to
Stavropoulos’s view, that Hart’s conceptual analysis is nonambitious, which
means that it relies neither on words’ usage nor on an “a priori” analy-
sis of our concepts alone to determine their properties. Undertaking the
challenge of the semantic sting argument, the paper offers a charitable in-
terpretation of this argument, which is called the semantic-properties-test
103. Id. at 214–215.
104. Id. at 220.
105. Id. at 221.
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argument. It is shown, however, that Hart can successfully eschew this latter
criticism. Hart’s conceptual analysis as nonambitious ensures that no sting
can sting his legal theory. This study defends the view that Hart’s method-
ological claims were rather modest and that he was aware of the limits of
conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. He was far ahead of his time.
